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it is argued that transformation’s ability to find wide and enduring resonance has had 
much to do with its emergence as a transitional site of compromise that allowed erstwhile 
political and ideological adversaries to navigate a complex social and political transition. 
A quarter of a century after the moment of transition, this article interrogates South 
Africa’s continuing investment in this idea of transformation and addresses the 
implications of its continuing dominance in how South Africa constitutes itself and 
navigates self-understanding. In essence, the article argues that whilst the imperative of 
constitutional transformation may have formed around a common commitment to 
constitutional rights and values, its lived manifestation in what has emerged as the 
hegemonic discourse of transformative constitutionalism with its bias for adjudication 
driven social change has negated any pretensions it may have projected of being an 
emancipatory discourse directed at disrupting and undoing the multiple pernicious 
legacies  colonial-apartheid.  
Keywords: Adjudication, compromise, emancipation, inequality, liberation, 
transformation, transformative constitutionalism.1 
“We are better placed to move in on the enemy because today we have a popular army, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe, capable of speaking to the enemy in the language he understands 
best.”  
Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress, 19822 
“The violence of our enemies is a warning to us.  We who are committed to peaceful 
negotiation, also have a warning to them.  Our warning is that our readiness to negotiate 
should not be mistaken for weakness.” 
PW Botha, President of South Africa, 19853 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
After centuries of institutionalised black subjugation and dispossession that culminated 
in a racist colonial-apartheid State, the protracted constitutional negotiations of the 
1990s were widely dubbed a miracle.4  The popularly held notion of a miracle in many 
 
1 I wish to thank Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Tshepo Madlingozi, Mtendeweka Mhango, Joel Modiri and Salim 
Nakhjavani for the insightful comments that they gave on earlier drafts. I am grateful to Silindiwe Sibanda, my 
ever faithful and attentive editor, for her inputs that went into finalising this essay. I am also grateful to the 
anonymous reviewers for their comments and inputs that strengthen the arguments. Any errors or omissions 
remain my own.  
 I acknowledge the funding support received during the writing of this essay from the research project “ALICE - 
Strange Mirrors, Unsuspected Lessons”, co-ordinated by Boaventura de Sousa Santos 
2  Tambo OR “Act in unity” – speech delivered on 8 January 1982 on the occasion of the 70th Anniversary 
of the African National Congress available at https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/january-8th-
statements-statement-national-executive-committee-occasion-70th-anniversary-anc (accessed 16 April 
2020). 
3  Botha PW The infamous Rubicon speech August 1985 at the opening of the National Party Congress 
available at 
https://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv01538/04lv01600/05lv01638/06lv0
1639.htm (accessed 16 April 2020). 
4  The idea of a miracle has been used in numerous books, articles and films. A few examples are : Sparks 
A Beyond the miracle –inside the new South Africa Johannesburg : Jonathan Ball (2003); Turok B Beyond 
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ways captures, on the one hand, a transition to a constitutional democracy that has been 
widely characterised as being relatively peaceful, orderly and by most accounts lawful. 
On the other hand, less obvious but nonetheless implicit in this idea of a miracle is the 
transmogrification of former “enemies” into co-sponsors of the “new” South Africa in 
circumstances few would have imagined possible a decade earlier. How did this 
happen? How was it possible that erstwhile “enemies” emerged from the negotiating 
table outwardly espousing a shared sense of triumph and commitment to a common 
non-racial vision, palatable to both black and white people, as to the country’s future? 
Beyond commitments to constitutional rules, institutions, doctrines and values, how 
were they able to find each other, let alone establish a common grammar capable of 
transcending their centuries old history of racial antipathy sourced in colonisation? In 
the absence of a clear winner or loser, circumstances demanded that the parties 
establish a grammar of compromise. The primary organising idea at the heart of that 
grammar, I will argue here, became, and remains, that of transformation, considered by 
many as being sourced in, delineated and, ultimately, mandated by the Constitution.5  
In search of a grammar of compromise capable of enduring beyond the exigencies 
of the initial post-1994 transition, an accommodating discourse of transformation 
emerged, arguably, as the preferred lexicon around which the co-sponsors of the “new” 
South Africa could interact to frame an agenda for political, social, economic, 
organisational, institutional and structural change in both the public and private realms.  
From education,6 to sports,7 to the media,8 to business,9 to the economy,10 to politics,11 
 
the miracle – development and economy in South Africa: a reader Cape Town: Fair Share  (1999); 
Friedman S, Moss G, Obery I et al (eds), The small miracle: South Africa's negotiated settlement Cape 
Town: Ravan Press (1992); Waldmeir P Anatomy of a miracle: the end of apartheid and the birth of the 
new South Africa  New York : WW Norton & Company (1997); and Miracle Rising (2013), a documentary 
film directed by Brett Lotriet Best. 
5  In this article, I will use the singular “Constitution” to refer mainly to the 1996 South African 
Constitution, but where the context suggests it such reference will also include the transitional 1994 
interim Constitution. 
6  See Vambe M "Opening and transforming South African education" (2005) 20  Open Learning: The 
Journal of Open, Distance and e-Learning 285; Badat S "Transforming South African higher education, 
1990-2003: goals, policy initiatives and critical challenges and issues" in Coete N, Pillay P, Badat S et al  
National policy and a regional response in South African Higher Education UK : James Currey (2004). 
7  Desai A (ed), The race to transform: sports in post- apartheid South Africa Pretoria: HSRC Press (2010). 
8 Berger G. "Towards an analysis of the South African media and transformation, 1994-99" (2000) 38 
Transformation 82; Steenveld L. “Transforming the media: a cultural approach.” (2004) 18 Critical Arts 
92. 
9  Iheduru O “Black economic power and nation-building in post-apartheid South Africa” (2004) 42 The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 1. 
10  Terreblanche S Lost in transformation - South Africa's search for a new future since 1986  
Johannesburg : KMM Review Publishing Co (2012). 
11  Sisk T Democratization in South Africa: the elusive social contract  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (1995); Cameron R & Tapscott C "The challenges of state transformation in South Africa" (2000) 
20 Public Administration & Development 81. 
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to language,12 to the courts,13 to policing,14 I argue here that  post-1994 the grammar of 
transformation emerged as the common vector for negotiating and navigating change.  
Therefore, at face value, it is arguable that transformation was widely embraced as 
a totalising grammar reflective of the nation’s collective acceptance of the inevitability 
of change, notwithstanding the contestation over this grammar of transformation 
within South Africa owing to its inherent ambiguity as to the exact nature of the change 
it entails and what remedial action(s) it necessitates from one context to the next. 
Despite this, as I shall demonstrate, South Africa remains deeply invested in the idea of 
transformation as process, goal and, above all, a constitutional imperative that has 
found ultimate theoretical expression in the court-centric notion of transformative 
constitutionalism. This latter notion has become, it can be said, the pre-eminent 
conceptual framing typifying post-1994 South African constitutionalism; indeed, the 
South African Council for Higher Education - during its review and accreditation process 
of the LLB degree – pronounced the hegemony of transformative constitutionalism by 
positing it as one of the pillars of South African legal education.15  
To better contextualise the article’s argument it is necessary to take a step back and 
contemplate where South Africa finds itself in basic political-economic terms 25 years 
after the official demise of apartheid. Notwithstanding the multi-sectoral expressions of 
commitment over the past two decades to what has come to be widely known as a 
transformative constitutional project, it remains extremely difficult to capture in words 
and numbers as well as with sufficient precision and pathos, the exact nature and extent 
of the disparities in material living conditions, life opportunities, and social provisioning 
that stubbornly persist between blacks and whites in South Africa. Numerous studies 
have sought to detail these disparities rooted in our history and how they continue to be 
a commonplace feature of contemporary South Africa.  
For example, in 1994, Herbst recorded that 53% of all African people were living 
below the poverty line as compared to only 2% of all white people; also, at that time the 
education budget for white children was 5 times that spent on African children; whilst 
 
12  De Klerk V "Language in South Africa: the role of language in national transformation, reconstruction 
and development: Vic Webb"  (2004) 25 Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 83. 
13  Dugard J "Judging the judges: towards an appropriate role for the judiciary in South Africa's 
transformation" (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 965; Hoexter C "Judicial policy revisited: 
transformative adjudication in administrative law" 2008 (24) South African Journal on Human Rights 
281.  
14 Gastrow P & Shaw M "In search of safety: police transformation and public responses in South Africa" 
(2001) 130 Daedalus 259. 
15  In the review process the cross-cutting presence of transformative constitutionalism across law faculty 
curricula was a stated criterion for the continuing accreditation of law faculties. A failure to 
demonstrate this was a ground upon which accreditation could be lost or awarded subject to 
qualification. See Council for Higher Education National Review Manual: Bachelor of Laws (LLB) 
(2015) at 28 available at http://nr-
online.che.ac.za/html_documents/LLB/National_Reviews_%20Manual_20150915.pdf (accessed 27 
March 2020). 
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at the level of tertiary education 4,467 out of every 100,000 white people were enrolled 
as compared with 665 out of every 100,000 African people.16 Later, in 1998, the Poverty 
and Inequality Report recorded that 50% of the poorest in the population 
(overwhelmingly black) received only 11% of the national income whilst 7% of the 
population (overwhelmingly white) received over 40% of the national income.17  The 
Poverty Trends Report reported that between 2000-2011 poverty levels dropped, albeit 
largely due to government social grants. However, despite this drop, according to the 
same Report, inequality levels in South Africa remained amongst the highest in the 
world.18 Coupled with numerous other socio-economic disparities in education, health 
care, land distribution, basic sanitation, inadequate infrastructure and rapid 
urbanisation, as early as 2011 Marais poignantly captured the prevailing state of post–
1994 South Africa:  
“[I]nequality has widened, precariousness is routine and a palpable sense of 
unfairness is rampant. The problem is not simply one of ‘poverty’’ – a lack of 
means – but of the glaring disparities that assault people day in and out.  A 
seething sense of injustice exists, generating rancour and insubordination.”19 
Of course, I should not be read as suggesting that there have been absolutely no changes 
in  material living conditions and life opportunities, nor that there have not been any 
policies or laws targeted at redressing these disparities in post-1994 South Africa.20 
Indeed, there has been a proliferation of legislated affirmative action, education, 
employment equity, health care and housing programs targeted at “advancing the 
equality” of “previously disadvantaged groups”, especially along the axes of race, gender 
and sexual orientation. However, what has become apparent is that not only have these 
transformative initiatives failed to deliver a miracle equivalent in structural and 
material change that matches the much celebrated transformative constitutional 
“miracle”, but that these initiatives, as is argued here, have largely left intact the racial, 
economic, cultural, and epistemic hierarchies associated with colonial-apartheid.21  
 
16 Herbst J "South Africa: economic crises and distributional imperatives" in Stedman S (ed) South Africa: 
the political economy of transformation Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rieiner (1994) at 30-31. 
17  May J, Budlender D, Mokate R, Rogerson C & Stavrou A "Poverty and inequality in South Africa: Report 
Prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for 
Poverty and Inequality; Summary Report, 13 May, 1998" Singapore: Praxis Publishing (1998). 
18  StatsSA, "Poverty trends in South Africa: an examination of absolute poverty between 2006 and 2011" 
Pretoria : Statistics South Africa (2014). See also Marais H South Africa pushed to the limit - the political 
economy of change Cape Town: UCT Press (2011) at 205. 
19  Marais (2011) at 4. 
20  See National Planning Commission “ National Planning Commission Diagnostic Overview” (2011). 
21  See generally Madlingozi T “Social justice in a time of neo-apartheid constitutionalism: critiquing the 
anti-black economy of recognition, incorporation and distribution” (2017) 28 Stellenbosch Law Review 
123; Modiri J “Conquest and constitutionalism: first thoughts on an alternative jurisprudence” (2018) 
34 South African Journal on Human Rights 300; and Dladla N "The liberation of history and the end of 
South Africa: some notes towards an Azanian historiography in Africa” (2018) 34 South African Journal 
on Human Rights  415. 
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To further demonstrate my point, the one most illustrative example of how the 
underlying legacies of colonial-apartheid continue to impact black South Africans, 
including the so-called “born-frees”, is that of the events surrounding the 2015-16 
student revolts usually collectively referred to as the #Feesmustfall movement.22 
Beyond the obvious and immediate protests against unaffordable fees, the social, 
political, economic and epistemic upheaval of #feesmustfall has rightly been 
characterised by some commentators as being demonstrative of a generational drift 
towards profound disillusionment with, if not outright disavowal of, the idea of the 
“miracle” of the “new” South Africa of which “born-frees” are imagined to be the 
primary beneficiaries .23 Commentators have remarked that #feesmustfall actually 
encapsulated a number of pressing and, often, intersecting existential anxieties 
reflecting how black students perceived their place within, first, the university and, 
secondly, more broadly, the South African constitutional project. According to these 
commentators, #feesmustfall was characterised by, amongst other things , a call to 
decolonise the curriculum as an implicit rejection of the prevalent grammar of 
transformation in universities;24 a critique of the university as a “site of epistemic and 
ontological warfare”;25 evidence of the “unravelling of the uncertainty of who we are as 
a country”;26 and that, as an overarching movement, it was primarily  
“invested in the work of broad social critique of the function of education in 
relation to the terms of the transition, its failure to escape the long hand of 
colonial violence and dispossession, and its inability to posit a future into 
which black students felt willing to step”27. 
As a historic moment of rupture, albeit a somewhat provincialised one within the 
university space and its surrounds, #feesmustfall brought into sharp focus questions 
about the perceived gains of the politics of transition, the compromises made on behalf 
of future generations, and the transformative project that ensued. #Feesmustfall is a 
subject to which I will return later in this article.  
 
22 Gillespie and Naidoo describe the coming into being of the #fallism movement as follows: 
“The mustfall hashtags took their orientation from the call for the toppling of the Rhodes statue, 
but quickly came to define an attitude of restless, radicalizing critique and a predilection for 
insistent, sometimes belligerent, political claims in a generation of young black people impatient 
with the enduring colonial and apartheid logics of South African society.” 
Gillespie K & Naidoo LA “# MustFall: the South African student movement and the politics of time” (2019) 
118 South Atlantic Quarterly 190 at 193. 
23 On born-frees see Chikane R Breaking a rainbow, building a nation: the politics behind #MustFall 
movements Johannesburg: Picador Africa (2018) at 6-8. 
24 Letsoalo M & Pero Z “Historically white universities and the white gaze: critical reflections on the 
decolonisation of the LLB curriculum” (2020) 14 Pretoria Student Law Review 1. 
25 Motimele M "The rupture of neoliberal times as the foundation for emancipatory epistemologies" 
(2019) 118 South Atlantic Quarterly 205 at 211. 
26  See Chikane (2018) at 22. 
27  Gillespie K & Naidoo LA "Between the cold war and the fire: the student movement, antiassimilation, 
and the question of the future in South Africa" (2019) 118 South Atlantic Quarterly 226 at 235. 
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Taking into account the many political-economic continuities and social tensions 
that have become a seemingly indelible feature of post-apartheid South Africa, my 
mission in this article is to interrogate the value or contribution of South Africa’s 
persistence with a grammar of transformation in as far as it has sought to imagine itself 
as engaged in the work of undoing the pernicious legacies of colonial-apartheid. In 
particular, I will examine whether, and how, a grammar of transformation contributes, 
first, to helping us make sense of deepening political-economic disparities, and, 
secondly, and most importantly, charting emancipatory paths that disrupt colonial-
apartheid’s legacies and deliver liberation.  
Turning my focus to this grammar’s most prominent theorised manifestation, 
namely, transformative constitutionalism, I ask what, beyond a theoretical commitment 
to human rights, constitutional values, as well as a law driven and court-centric 
framework of social and political change, does transformative constitutionalism offer  in 
terms of disruptive redistributive and reparatory ideas, measures and strategies to 
address South Africa’s sustained and deepening inequalities? 
Against this background that suggests that the everyday reality of a majority of  
South Africans continues to be structurally and materially precarious in spite of the best 
transformative reading or theorisation of the Constitution, in the next part I first 
examine the word “transformation” in etymological terms in order to problematise its 
emergence as an all-pervasive discourse of change in South Africa. In doing this I pivot 
on Ronaldo Munck’s provocation positing that the appeal of a grammar of 
transformation, despite its vagueness, was reflective of a political compromise 
necessitated by the inadequacy of reform and the impossibility of revolution at the time 
of the transition. In part 3, I illustrate how the grammar of transformation has been 
variously and contextually deployed despite an apparent lack of consensus as to a 
common social vision in political-economic terms or even a point of departure in 
ideological or discursive terms. In part 4, building on the idea of a grammar of 
transformation, I examine the emergence of transformative constitutionalism as the 
pre-eminent theorisation and discursive account of contemporary South African 
constitutionalism. In part 5, I critique transformative constitutionalism for its failure to 
contribute meaningfully to our ability to make sense of our understanding of 
contemporary social and political tensions outside of the framework of adjudication. In 
the concluding part, I call into question the prevailing discursive commitment and 
investment in transformative constitutionalism and suggest that as a court-centric 
discourse it has negated any pretensions it may have projected of being an 
emancipatory discourse directed at disrupting the multiple legacies of colonial-
apartheid. 
2. WHAT IS TRANSFORMATION? DELIMITING TRANSFORMATION’S DEFINITIONAL 
CONTOURS 
Before proceeding further, I think it appropriate to briefly address some definitional 
issues. It is notable that few writers deploying a grammar of transformation expend 
much time or effort on defining it or even offering an understanding of what their own 
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perspective on transformation is. Without unnecessarily belabouring the matter, I think 
it useful to start from the most likely point of consensus, namely, that the noun 
“transformation” is etymologically derived from the verb “transform”.  “Transform” has 
several meanings, namely, “1. to change in form, appearance, or structure; 
metamorphose; 2. to change in condition, nature, or character; convert; 3 to change into 
another substance; transmute28 “. “Transformation” means the following: “1. the act or 
process of transforming; 2. the state of being transformed; 3. change in form, 
appearance, nature, or character29 ”.  What should be evident is that there is no implicit 
value judgment nor a normative proposition in the meaning of “transformation”; it is 
altogether neutral when viewed in the abstract, merely signifying change in form, 
substance or nature.  
At a conceptual level, it has no inherent philosophical, ideological or political bias 
nor an implicit set of commitments. Rather, it attains particularised meaning through 
being deployed in particular contexts in relation to other ideas, conditions, states of 
being, or historical reference points. Often its assigned meaning is a projection of a 
speaker’s own commitments, viewpoint or assumptions that imbue “transformation” 
with meaning in that moment. Therefore, to speak of “transformation” in purely neutral 
terms is uncommon in practice; “transformation” when used almost invariably harbours 
an agenda.  
Writing in 1996 and speculating as to the discursive traction enjoyed by the notion 
of transformation at that historical moment, Ronaldo Munck suggested that the then 
prevailing “uncertain global situation and crisis of perspective” were important factors 
in the turn towards a grammar of transformation, despite the term’s tendency towards 
ambiguity and instability. 30 In his own words, Munck vividly captures this as follows:  
“...[T]he very nature and meaning of the term 'transformation' itself is quite 
unclear... My feeling is that the idea of transformation emerged as a response 
to the inadequacy of the binary opposition reform/revolution in the post-
1990 conjuncture...It is at once a goal and a process which is ongoing.  It does, 
of course mean many different things to different people, some usages being 
more innocent than others.  At the moment, it is tempting to abandon the term 
altogether given its current (mis)use, and its almost complete devaluation and 
stripping of meaning. It seems, sometimes, that transformation and democracy 
refer simply to the outcome that the user desires. Or, as Lewis Carroll put it in 
Alice Through The Looking Glass - 'When I use a word, it means just what I 
choose it to mean'...But, in truth, we cannot drop a term for these reasons as 
all words are a contested terrain for meaning.31” (Emphasis mine).         
At the heart of Munck’s characterisation, I suggest, is the expression of an initial unease 
with the grammar of transformation that is in the process of taking root. Munck depicts 
 
28  See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/transform?s=t (accessed  16 April 2020). 
29  See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/transformation?s=t (accessed  16 April 2020). 
30  Munck R "For a sociology of transformation" (1996) 29 Transformation 41. 
31  Munck (1996) at 43. 
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transformation as a somewhat amorphous, yet non-neutral, notion which whilst 
contested and contestable retains its currency by straddling seemingly irreconcilable 
positions espousing revolutionary ends, on the one hand, and more moderate 
reformism or reconstruction, on the other.32  As such, Munck can be read to suggest that 
the appeal of transformation, despite its inexactitude, is to be found in the need for a 
middle ground in the early 1990s. In short, the appeal of a grammar of transformation is 
to be found in the fact that, practically, it reflected a social and political compromise of 
sorts allowing for both those in favour of the least intrusive interference with the status 
quo and those agitating for revolutionary change, to align themselves with an agenda 
for a conception of change capable of accommodating their individual senses of what 
constituted desirable or acceptable social and political change.   
In spite of apparent misgivings about its imprecision, Munck’s essay unfolds 
premised on his own, somewhat reluctant, acceptance of transformation’s utility in a 
South African context.  Munck says: 
“We all start from different subject positions in understanding a term such as 
'transformation'. Its meaning is constructed on a discursive terrain where 
contradictory articulations play themselves out in a fluid and conflictual 
process. My own preference is not to use the term 'transformation' as a covert 
way of talking about socialism in polite social circles so as not to be laughed 
out of court … [Transformation] is a process which is unfolding and whose 
outcome is uncertain. It is neither (merely) reformism nor (really) revolution. 
It defines a terrain of struggle and it articulates a strategy for struggle. It calls 
for democratising all spheres of social life and an empowerment of those 
hitherto disempowered.33” (Emphasis mine). 
Of course, the challenge then is to reconcile Munck’s ostensible misgivings with his 
subsequent turn to and use of transformation in the remainder of his essay, albeit 
subject to his own predispositions as to how it must be understood as promoting far - 
reaching democratisation and empowerment.  One way to make sense of this, I suggest, 
is, that for Munck a grammar of transformation creates a space of possibility for present 
and future contestation in which no ideological position can claim undisputed 
ascendancy. In brief, transformation establishes a compromise space where those 
engaged in ideological battle can (cordially) co-exist whilst respectively advancing their 
causes, principally around ideals of democracy and empowerment.  
Therefore, I suggest that the essence of adopting a grammar of transformation as a 
product of the political compromises of the 1990s was in essence an agreement to 
change the status quo ante without settling the question of what the nature and 
substance of such change should be in philosophical, political or material terms. Put 
differently, I advance the view that the grammar of transformation in post-1994 South 
Africa has emerged as a site of compromise for, amongst others, political, social and 
economic engagement around universalistic, non-partisan, seemingly all-encompassing 
 
32  Munck (1996) at 43.  
33  Munck (1996) at 43.  
   
TRANSFORMATION AND  TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM  
 
Page | 393  
 
constitutional rights and values that are accommodative of divergent political visions, 
and therefore, almost of necessity, preclude any overt or binding ideological and 
material commitments. Of course, this must be understood in the light of the fact of the 
prevailing Euro-American hegemony of liberal democracy and the international neo-
liberal order that in the 1990s shaped, and indeed continues to shape, debates and 
imaginaries of what is thought possible politically, socially, economically, culturally and 
epistemologically.  
3.  THE DISCOURSE OF TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA - A GRAMMAR FOR 
MOST CAUSES? 
Before eventually turning to transformative constitutionalism, I want to locate the 
arguments I make here within the context of South Africa’s wider discursive turn to a 
grammar of transformation. It is notable that, despite there being no discursive 
consensus as to its scope, meaning or range, transformation retains a cross-cutting 
appeal, variability and utility to people advancing different agendas or ideological 
standpoints; meaning that in practice, transformation as an idea deployed contextually, 
beyond advocating for change, has no commonly held conception as to it nature or 
content, yet it is remains widely used.  A few examples will bear out this point.  
The appeal to a grammar of transformation as part of the South African political 
landscape precedes the 1994 transition to democracy.  Take for instance, Stephen 
Stedman who, writing shortly before the democratic transition, invokes the notion of 
transformation with respect to significant political events that occurred in the 1970s 
and 1980s.  According to Stedman, these events were transformational in the sense that 
they contributed to the eventual demise of the then ruling National Party regime, and 
created an opening for democratic transition. 34  Transformation as used by Stedman is 
neither a term of art nor necessarily ideologically loaded; rather, it is invoked in 
somewhat colourless analytical terms as signifying change from one historical moment 
to the next.  Simply put, transformation here connotes a seemingly ideologically 
agnostic historical shift.  This, therefore, allows Stedman to speak of transformative 
events during apartheid under the National Party (transformation 1)35 as well as a 
future transformation after apartheid’s eventual demise and anticipated changes under 
an incoming ANC regime (transformation 2).36 This depiction of transformative 
possibilities under either oppressive historical conditions or (then) future conditions of 
political freedom , I suggest, is no mere slippage; rather it is reflective of what Stedman 
terms a “dialectic at work in the creation of a stable democracy”37.  Stedman’s 
deployment of transformation here is decidedly episodic and descriptive, meaning that 
it is event and context driven focusing more on a change to the status quo rather than an 
ideologically driven change.  
 
34  Stedman S J "South Africa: transition and transformation" in Stedman (ed) (1994).  
35  Stedman (1994) at 24.  
36  Stedman (1994) at 24. 
37  Stedman (1994) at 24.  
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Also writing in the pre-democratic era, Neville Alexander’s conception of 
transformation is distinctly ideologically driven and material.  In sketching what he 
believed to be “a radical strategy for the transformation of the university in South Africa 
into a ‘people’s university’”, Alexander argues as follows: 
“Suffice it to say that anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-elitist, anti-classist, anti-
authoritarian, anti-conformist educational practices, new methodologies, new 
syllabi, new ways of assessment, new attitudes towards language, in short a 
new concept of the university must needs be realised if we are to break out of 
the suffocating embrace of the intellectual, political, social and cultural barbed 
wire which surrounds all universities in South Africa today.”38 
Thus, for Alexander, transformation here entails demanding nothing short of a radical 
turn away from the practices and prevailing ideas under the ancient regime premised 
on racist, patriarchal and capitalist ideas. Rather, a transformed university space would 
have to encapsulate substantive institutional, structural, cultural, epistemic and 
pedagogical changes. Significantly for Alexander, the question of embarking on any 
process of transformation required that one also grapple with the question of power 
and what the power configuration would be after the fall of apartheid as this would 
undoubtedly determine the realms of what change was possible.  
A grammar of transformation is central in Sampie Terreblanche’s seminal text, A 
history of inequality in South Africa 1652-2002, and some of his subsequent works. 
According to Terreblanche, whilst the fall of apartheid brought about a much-needed 
political transformation, he remains critical of the lack of socio-economic 
transformation needed to address inherited systemic inequalities. Terreblanche argues 
persuasively that the perpetuation of systemic economic exploitation and exclusion, in 
spite of democratic gains, is the result of a failure to transform the nature of power.  
Terreblanche calls for a deeper transformative power shift premised on ideologically 
driven socio-economic policy changes designed to usher in an era of social-democracy.39 
In essence, for Terreblanche, transformation, properly conceived, is necessarily multi-
dimensional, encompassing , at least, changes on the political, social and economic axes. 
Ideologically driven transformation, according to Terreblanche, is pivotal for mapping 
out the substance and method of displacing the prevailing liberal paradigm of 
“democratic capitalism” adopted by the ANC government post-1994.40 
Yet another example of the invocation of a grammar of transformation that also 
illustrates its variability is found in the field of urban transformation. According to John 
Williams, transformation is the “defining concept of the new order in South Africa”41 , 
and in order to make sense of its demands, it is best understood by placing the 
apartheid city at the centre of the problem. According to Williams, to fully appreciate 
 
38 Alexander N " The politics of national and institutional transformation" in Alexander N  Some are more 
equal than others -  essays on the transition in South Africa Cape Town: Buchu Books (1993) at 8. 
39  Terreblanche (2012) at 18-20.  
40  Terreblanche S A history of inequality in South Africa, 1652-2002 Durban: UKZN Press (2002) at 138. 
41  Williams J “South Africa: urban transformation” (2000) 17 Cities 167. 
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the imperatives of transformation in democratic South Africa, it is necessary to grapple 
with the calculated nature of the legislated spatial segregation that enabled racial 
separateness via the carving up of towns and cities into prosperous well- serviced white 
zones at the centre with depressed under-serviced black zones at the periphery.42 
Williams argues that successfully achieving South Africa’s social, economic and political 
transformation will depend largely on transforming the country’s socio-spatial 
arrangements so as to bring about equitable access to the city that will then lead to 
further far -reaching changes.  
According to Williams, successful transformation requires nothing less than a 
paradigm shift that is multi-dimensional, programmatic, and leads to “ visible 
sustainable results of systemic change in the South African legal order”.43  In spite of 
this ambitious conception of transformation, Williams recognises that transformation 
has “as many divergent/convergent meanings as there are potential 
interpreters/decoders of the term”, which fact he considers to be a serious limit to the 
possibilities that it can realise.44 
Ultimately, these different examples above are but illustrations of how a grammar 
of transformation has been adopted to advance different conceptions of what the nature 
and content of change entails or might entail, particularly that engaging with or framing 
the debates about what the fundamental or overarching nature of change in South 
Africa should look like. Obviously, these examples are but a sliver of the extensive 
number of instances that the grammar of transformation has been invoked as writers 
from different perspectives, worldviews and disciplines address themselves to 
questions of change. What is worth pointing out at this juncture is that despite different 
points of departure the grammar of transformation allows for various speakers to 
appear to be in conversation on a singular concern – transformation – yet the reality is 
that each one can be driven by different sets of underlying assumptions, concerns and 
motivations.  
This then begs the question as to what work this grammar of transformation is 
actually performing beyond being a via media, a middle ground or place of compromise 
perpetuating the illusion of a space conceived of around a common (constitutional) 
vision in which different actors can appear, be seen to engage in common, before 
retreating to their ideological positions and continuing to defend their own ideas of 
what the ideal should be. Simply put, we must ask what the value of a grammar of 
transformation is when it can also serve to obfuscate rather than make clear what its 
interlocutors really stand for without the need for extraneous decoding.  This, of course, 
then raises some rather pressing questions as to what to make of post-1994 South 
African constitutionalism that has come to be overwhelmingly framed in terms of this 
self-same grammar of transformation.  
 
42  Williams (2000) at 167.  
43  Williams (2000) at 171. 
44  Williams (2000) at 168-9. 
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4. FROM SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICALLY MANDATED TRANSFORMATION 
TO TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM - THE RISE, REIGN AND PLATEAU 
OF A PUTATIVE NATION-BUILDING DISCOURSE 
Unsurprisingly, the Constitution makes no mention of, nor reference to, transformation. 
This fact has not stood in the way of a proliferation of literature positing transformation 
as one of the core ideas around which constitutional meaning making is conducted. 
According to Cathi Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt, the notion of transformation as “both 
means and ends” is derived from and encapsulated in the text of the Constitution.45  As 
to the nature and form of constitutional transformation, Albertyn and Goldblatt typify it 
as advancing an agenda of far-reaching change to the make-up of South Africa as the 
country works to undo the profound inequities of the past.  In their own words they 
assert :  
 “[W]e understand transformation to require a complete reconstruction of the 
state and society, including redistribution of power and resources along 
egalitarian lines. The challenge of achieving equality within this 
transformation project involves the eradication of systematic forms of 
domination and material disadvantages based on race, gender, class and other 
grounds of inequality. It also entails the development of opportunities which 
allow people to realise their full human potential within positive social 
relations.”46 (Emphasis mine). 
Taking Albertyn and Goldblatt’s account of the type of transformation envisaged by the 
Constitution at face value, it would be fair to conclude that the transformative outcomes 
they envisage are nothing short of radical. However, read in the context of their broader 
call for an “indigenous jurisprudence of equality”, the apparent disconnect between the 
radical posture implicit in their characterisation of transformation and the limitations 
inherent in a court-led process of legal interpretation suggests a profound mismatch 
between means and ends.  
Indeed, the embrace of a grammar of transformation is readily discernible in the 
Constitutional Court’s underlying reasoning in some judgments that the Court has 
adjudicated to give meaning to the Constitution. For example, in an early Constitutional 
Court case, transformation as a constitutional imperative was approvingly invoked by 
Justice Mahomed in Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) v President of South Africa                               
47 (AZAPO (1996)). In AZAPO, Mahomed DP typified the Constitution’s transformative 
imperative as underwriting the impetus in that case to privilege reconciliation over 
redress. In that case certain sections of the legislation establishing the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) were challenged by the surviving family members of 
persons murdered by apartheid forces, including Steve Biko’s family. In holding that the 
 
45  Albertyn C & Goldblatt B "Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the development of an 
indigenous jurisprudence of equality" (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 248 at 248.  
46  Albertyn & Goldblatt (1998) at 248 & 249. See also Moseneke D "The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial 
Lecture-Transformative adjudication" (2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights 315. 
47  1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC). 
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impugned amnesty provisions did not violate the Constitution, Mahomed DP reasoned 
thus: 
“… [T]he country begins the long and necessary process of healing the wounds 
of the past, transforming anger and grief into a mature understanding and 
creating the emotional and structural climate essential for the ‘reconciliation 
and reconstruction’ which informs the very difficult and sometimes painful 
objectives of the amnesty articulated in the epilogue.”48 
Therefore, according to Mahomed DP, essential to pursuing a transformative agenda on 
a national scale, was the fostering of an environment wherein human relations between 
perpetrator and victim were made possible, in spite of victims’, or their survivors’, 
protestations against what they experienced as a continuing injustice.49  According to 
Mahomed DP, the importance of transformation is such that it might render it 
“necessary in crucial areas to close the book on that past” in the name of nation-building 
and the promotion of a common future. 50 Jurisprudentially, transformation here can be 
read as either privileging national interests over holding individual perpetrators to 
account, or as privileging reconciliation over justice - in essence transformation as 
demanding compromise.51   
By way of contrast, in a later Constitutional Court case concerning an 
administrative decision on the distribution of commercial fishing rights,  Bato Star 
Fisheries v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism52 (Bato (2004)), Constitutional 
Court Justice Ngcobo characterises transformation as being largely concerned with 
“redressing the historical imbalances caused by unfair discrimination”.53 In particular, 
Ngcobo J notes that “the measures that bring about transformation will inevitably affect 
some members of the society adversely, particularly those coming from the previously 
advantaged communities”54. In this latter instance, transformation, whilst similarly 
posited as being forward-looking and in service to the attainment of equality, now 
interestingly requires that we grapple with the past (rather than look past it) and its 
consequences as we seek to ameliorate its excesses. Again, in this case a gesture 
pointing at transformation demanding compromise is discernible in the Court’s 
reasoning.   
Apart from  Bato Star and other cases involving the transformation of the fisheries 
industry, such as, Ocean Ecological Adventures (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
 
48  AZAPO (1996) at para 17 (emphasis added). 
49  The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995. 
50  AZAPO (1996) at para 2. 
51 See generally the many essays written in the following collection reflecting upon the AZAPO (1996) 
judgment in Van Marle K & Le Roux W Law, memory, and the legacy of Apartheid: ten years after AZAPO 
v. President of South Africa Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press (2007). 
52 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
53  Bato (2004) at para 71. 
54  Bato (2004) at para 76. 
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Affairs,55 where the legislative or policy framework specifically invokes a grammar of 
transformation, it is worth mentioning that the courts have not invested much effort 
into developing the notion of transformation as an explicit constitutional principle or 
value.56 Read against the amount of stock invested by scholars (and public discourses) 
into the grammar of transformation, this fact of no attempt at the judicial development 
of a constitutional principle on this score is notable. I would suggest that this may be as 
a result of the courts’ recognition that beyond its rhetorical value, establishing 
transformation as a justiciable constitutional principle is unworkable owing to its 
ambiguous nature and the absence of any clearly discernible judicial standards against 
which to test whether the Constitution’s multi-faceted, and sometimes contradictory, 
transformative commitments are always rationally, and with consistency and 
coherence, reconcilable.57  
In legal scholarship, the grammar of transformation has been taken up 
enthusiastically by many constitutional scholars in recognition of what they perceived 
as its apparent utility, timeliness and substantive potential insofar as it is believed to 
capture the Constitution’s commitments to fundamentally changing South Africa.58 In 
broad discursive terms this has translated into the emergence of transformative 
constitutionalism.59 Conceptually, transformative constitutionalism was introduced into 
the lexicon of South Africa’s constitutional discourse by Karl Klare.60 It has since then 
become arguably the most frequently and approvingly used term to describe South 
 
55  Ocean Ecological Adventures (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs [2019] 3 All SA 259 (WCC). 
See also New Foodcorp Holdings (Pty) Ltd & another v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
[2012] 2 All SA 518 (SCA).  
56 For example, reference is made here to the following cases where the Courts’ reasoning gestures 
approvingly to the idea of the Constitution being transformative and is generally supportive of its 
reasoning, but where very little or nothing in terms of reasoned substantiation of this view is 
proffered: Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy & others 2013 (7) BCLR 727 (CC); City of 
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum & another 2016 (9) BCLR 1133 (CC). 
57 For example, the contradictory readings of what transformation would entail in the majority and 
dissenting judgments of City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality ( see fn 55 above).  See  also Modiri J 
"Race, history, irresolution: reflections on City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality v Afriforum and 
the limits of “post-apartheid constitutionalism" (2019) 52 De Jure Law Journal 27.  
58 Pieterse M "What do we mean when we talk about transformative constitutionalism?" (2005) 20 SA 
Public Law 155. 
59  For example, see Botha H “Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (Part 1)” 2002 
TSAR 612; Botha H “Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism (Part 2)” 2003 TSAR 
20; Langa P “Transformative constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351; Roux T “Transformative 
constitutionalism and the best interpretation of the South African Constitution: distinction without a 
difference?” (2009) 20 Stell LR 258; van der Walt A “Tentative urgency: sensitivity for the paradoxes of 
stability and change in social transformation decisions of the Constitutional Court” (2001) 16 SAPL 1; 
van Marle K “Transformative constitutionalism as/and critique” (2009) 20 Stell LR 286; Bishop M & 
Price A (eds) A transformative justice : essays in honour of Pius Langa Cape Town : Juta (2015). 
60  Klare K "Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism" (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146.  
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Africa’s project of post-1994 constitutionalism.61 Transformative constitutionalism 
according to Klare is:  
“… [A] long-term project of constitutional enactment, interpretation, and 
enforcement committed (not in isolation, of course, but in a historical context of 
conducive political developments) to transforming a country's political and 
social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and 
egalitarian direction. Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of 
inducing large-scale social change through nonviolent political processes 
grounded in law. I have in mind a transformation vast enough to be inadequately 
captured by the phrase 'reform,' but something short of or different from 
'revolution' in any traditional sense of the word.” 62 
Resonating somewhat with Albertyn and Goldblatt’s more general depiction of 
constitutional transformation, Klare’s conception of transformative constitutionalism is 
similarly a bold and expansive notion whose concerns appropriately span democratic 
politics, social and institutional power relations, and broadly touches on questions of 
distributive justice. Sandra Liebenberg echoes similar sentiments, namely, that 
transformative constitutionalism “implies fundamental changes to unjust economic and 
social structures”, whilst at the same time seeking “to achieve a more equitable 
distribution of social and economic resources”63.  I have argued in earlier work that this 
framing of transformative constitutionalism, despite its seemingly radical posturing, has 
established little more than what can be described as a “discourse of hope” in that 
whilst pronouncing on structural and redistributive material questions, outside of 
adjudication its proponents rarely pronounce on these questions. 64 I will develop this 
point below.  
As already alluded to above, it is striking that whilst positing expansive and 
arguably radical notions of change, proponents of transformative constitutionalism 
frame South African constitutionalism primarily in juridical terms with courts being 
afforded a central role in giving meaning to, and determining the parameters of, 
constitutional transformation.  Whilst unlikely that it was Klare’s intention to limit the 
conception of transformative constitutionalism to narrow court-centric terms at the 
expense of cultivating or instilling more popular democratic and egalitarian 
redistributive ideals, transformative constitutionalism as a distinct discourse has 
evolved in such a way that it is almost entirely focused on socio-economic and 
politically infused constitutional adjudication. For example, retired Constitutional Court 
Justice Moseneke, echoing Klare, asserts that “[t]he transformative enterprise is of 
 
61  See also Roux (2009) who, whilst sceptical of its value, has made a similar observation about the 
proliferation of transformative constitutionalism at a conceptual level.  
62  Klare (1998) at 150. 
63  Liebenberg S Socio-economic rights: adjudication under a transformative constitution Cape Town: Juta 
(2010). 
64  Sibanda S "Not purpose-made! Transformative constitutionalism, post-independence constitutionalism 
and the struggle to eradicate poverty" (2011) 22 Stellenbosch Law Review 482 at 487. 
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course a legal enterprise and it occurs within the context of the law”65.  Justice 
Moseneke’s view is not an isolated instance; rather, it is the case that many writings 
within the discourse focus almost exclusively on litigation, case analysis, legal reasoning 
and justifying the judiciary’s role when it comes to attaining the right balance with 
respect to separation of powers questions and what other branches may experience as 
an intrusive form of judicial review.  
To the credit of proponents of transformative constitutionalism, they have 
recognised and acknowledged the limits of a legalistic adjudication driven conception of 
constitutionalism.66 A commonly held view amongst proponents of transformative 
constitutionalism is that it is a deeply imbedded traditionalism and conservatism 
characteristic of South African legal culture that poses a danger to the potentialities of 
transformative constitutionalism. 67 Legal culture, according to Dennis Davis and Karl 
Klare, comprises “the characteristic legal values, habits of mind, repertoire of 
arguments, and manners of expression shared by a group of lawyers at a given, 
historically situated time and place”68.  Therefore, the nub of the danger according to 
proponents is one of proper implementation, namely, that judges may, owing to the 
prevailing conservative legal culture and/or their politics, interpret and enforce the 
Constitution in ways that subvert its progressive and egalitarian vision of 
transformation.69  An example of how this concern has played itself out in practice is 
evident in how courts are often charged with failing to develop the common law to 
accord with the demands of transformative adjudication.70  In essence, the courts are 
said to have remained trapped in the ways of old and have thus served to arrest the 
Constitution’s potential to bring about transformation as envisioned by proponents of 
transformative constitutionalism. 
5. BEYOND A COURT-CENTRED GAZE: TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM’S 
REVERBERATING SILENCES 
My observations and the critique I offer here build on some of my earlier work where 
the nub of my critique was to argue that transformative constitutionalism was afflicted 
by such major “pitfalls” as to render it ill-suited to deliver  the type of emancipatory 
changes claimed in its name.71  Whilst I intend to build upon those earlier critical 
interventions, which I realise upon greater reflection and the passage of time are 
capable of a sanguine and redemptive reading, I revise those views here as I argue that 
 
65  Moseneke (2002) at 317 (emphasis mine). 
66  Klare (1998) at 170. 
67  Klare (1998) at 171-2 
68  Davis D & Klare K "Transformative constitutionalism and the common and customary law" (2010) 26 
South African Journal on Human Rights 403. 
69  See Moseneke (2002) at 315-316.   
70  See Davis & Klare (2010); Bhana D & Pieterse M "Towards a reconciliation of contract law and 
constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox revisited" (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 865. 
71  Sibanda (2011); Sibanda "Not quite a rejoinder: some thoughts and reflections on Michelman's 'Liberal 
constitutionalism, property rights and the assault on poverty'" (2013) 24 Stellenbosch Law Review 329. 
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there is no salvaging of transformative constitutionalism, since as imagined and 
practised it has exhausted any emancipatory potential I believed it to harbour.   
In making this argument, I advance the view that transformative constitutionalism, 
when confronted with questions of how to address issues of structural and material 
inequality, offers little beyond a jurisprudence grounded in the balancing of tensions 
between government policy, programs or conduct and entrenched constitutional rights 
– an approach whose discursive origins dovetail well with South Africa’s politics 
compromise.72  Simply put, I argue here that beyond a legalistic analysis of the 
constitution/al/ive as interpreted by the courts, transformative constitutionalist 
scholarship has singularly failed to engage with or offer meaningful critical insights into 
South Africa’s deepening political, economic, social, cultural and epistemic crisis. In 
short, the question I believe proponents of the discourse must answer, if it is to have 
any hope of justifying its current pride of place, is what does the discourse offer as a 
response to South Africa’s constitutive crisis in the making beyond litigation and 
decrying poor legal and policy implementation by the government? And most 
importantly, what or whose interests are served by its prevailing dominance over how 
South African constitutionalism has come to be construed within this grammar of 
transformation in the face of an unravelling of the compromises of the 1990s.   
Before continuing with my critique, a brief recap of the core claims and 
characteristics of transformative constitutionalism as a particular conception of South 
African constitutionalism will better contextualize the elaboration of the argument 
below. At its core, transformative constitutionalism, at least according to its proponents, 
is a constitutional project that is:  
(i) committed to changing the historically determined political, economic 
and social institutional power relationships in democratic, 
participatory and egalitarian ways; 
(ii) political in its nature with its vision of political social and economic 
change deriving from the Constitution and the history of its making;  
(iii) post-liberal in its orientation, in that it self-consciously departs from 
“traditional” liberal conceptions of constitutionalism; and  
(iv)  a “legal enterprise” under a supreme constitution wherein courts are 
central and have the ultimate final say on constitutional meaning-
making.  
Assuming that one accepts these as the core features of transformative 
constitutionalism, I argue further that contrasted with its claims postulating structural 
change and re-imagined egalitarian social and economic relations, in practice 
proponents of transformative constitutionalism have quite curiously set it limited, 
middle-of-the-road and legalistic intellectual and programmatic horizons.  In short, 
transformative constitutionalism, I argue, has done little to take us beyond what might 
 
72  For an early, almost prescient, account of the potential pitfalls or implications of a politics of 
compromise on undoing the material legacies of colonial-apartheid see: Mutua M “Hope and despair 
for a new South Africa: the limits of rights discourse” (1997) 10 Harv Hum Rts J 63. 
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be termed  enlightened liberal legalism. In other words, despite continuing to live and 
write in a political, economic and cultural milieu characterised by deepening inequality 
and social injustice, the radical claims propagated have not translated into much more 
than rights or law-based approaches to imagining change. From the literature, there is 
little evidence of other sustained work within the discourse directed at inculcating or 
influencing institutional or structural power shifts or far- reaching redistributive 
innovations beyond the courts.73   
So whilst it is certainly arguable that transformative constitutionalism has 
successfully established some measure of internal discursive coherence, I argue that 
this has been possible largely through proponents focusing their discursive 
interventions on institutional and rights related adjudication, whilst rarely 
demonstrating how transformative constitutionalism grapples with undoing the 
realities of South Africa’s largely undisturbed racial, social, cultural and epistemic 
hierarchies that are obviously fertile ground for what is undoubtedly a growing sense of 
disillusionment with respect to the Constitution and its popular promise to “improve 
the quality of life of all citizens”.  
In furthering my critique let me return to what proponents of transformative 
constitutionalism consider to be its Achilles heel, namely, what they typify as an 
impeding traditionalist and conservative South African legal culture. Assuming that one 
accepts this proposition, then it surely follows that a potential solution, or an integral 
part of it, has to be to work to negate the deficiencies of this culture by attending to, 
amongst other things, transformative legal education, legal reasoning and adjudicative 
 
73  For example, see Le Roux M & Davis D Lawfare – judging politics in South Africa Johannesburg : 
Jonathan Ball Publishers (2019).  The book, amongst others, concerns itself with the state of  
transformation and politics in post-1994 South Africa by focusing on “political cases”; with deliberateness 
it centres adjudication as the a key node of South African constitutionalism. This is of course what is 
fundamentally at stake with lawfare, the use of courts as a preferred site of political contestation. The 
authors, from the evidence provided in the book, if not supportive of, are comfortable with, the “good 
side” of lawfare. In the authors’ own words, they write at 19: “Lawfare is a central part of this discussion. 
As explained above, courts are an important and necessary site of accountability, and an instrument for 
realising the constitutional vision (the good side of lawfare). But they can and, indeed, have been abused 
by politicians precisely because they may be more decisive and effective than the messy, incremental 
process of politics (the bad side of lawfare). So while lawfare is a complex and contested concept, the 
manner in which the South African Constitution has envisaged the governance of the country mandates 
the courts to become partners with the other two arms of government in the reconstruction of society.  In 
turn, that means that political, economic and social controversies will be fought out in the courts, which is 
indeed what the constitution envisaged.” See for a contrary characterisation of lawfare Handmaker who 
says : “ However, in oppressive and imperialistic societies and political systems, or even in ostensibly 
liberal democratic regimes, law and even human rights can be a form of lawfare, taking negative, 
delegitimising and oppressive forms, justifying retrogressive policies and even reinforcing the hegemonic 
actions of states.” Handmaker  (2019). Researching legal mobilisation and lawfare (No 641). ISS Working 
Papers - General Series. International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University (ISS) available at 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/115129 (accessed 22 November 2020). 
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techniques.74  If this sounds overly simplistic, that is because it is and exposes a serious 
shortcoming in transformative constitutionalism’s framing of what is at stake as far as 
the project of the (re)constituting of South Africa in accordance with its tenets is 
concerned.   
By framing transformative constitutionalism’s main challenge as being legal culture 
without taking the next, most obvious step, namely, that of problematising it within the 
context of larger more pervasive hegemonic Eurocentric culture that overlaps neatly 
with a capitalist system rooted in colonial-apartheid, transformative constitutionalists 
(as avowed non-racists) have, most likely unwittingly, contributed to the perpetuation 
of white cultural and economic dominance despite professed commitments to 
advancing deep-seated society-wide structural and material change. In other words, by 
focusing predominantly on legal culture, proponents of transformative 
constitutionalism omit or fail to confront, what I argue are, the most pressing and 
urgent questions relating to the (re)constitution of South African society.  Questions, 
such as ,how to dislodge the well- preserved, largely racialised hierarchies of being, as 
well as the underlying systems, institutions and networks of knowledge, customs, social 
norms and practices that an adjudication centred conception of constitutionalism 
cannot in the ordinary course of events reach, let alone impact in a structurally 
cohesive, strategic and timeous manner. 
Writing in a slightly different context, Joel Modiri has poignantly captured the 
inadequacy of law driven change by remarking that “while the laws of the country have 
changed considerably, the architecture, framework and logic of colonialism-apartheid 
remains”75.  From within the discursive corridors of transformative constitutionalists, 
there is little evidence of a serious or sustained engagement with deepening lines of 
social, economic, political or cultural tensions as they have come to manifest. For 
example, it would be important and welcome to hear a transformative constitutionalist 
perspective on the #feesmustfall movement.  How would transformative 
constitutionalism help us make sense of the fallists’ call for free education as a 
constitutional right76 whilst also often calling into question the Constitution’s very 
legitimacy? Or fallists’ demands for greater access to the corridors of knowledge that 
are universities whilst simultaneously denouncing these very same spaces on the 
grounds that they retain racist, colonial, gendered, alienating and assimilationist 
institutional cultures that have arguably been the catalysts of many of the “domestic” 
campus protests that in many instances preceded the coalescence into the nationwide 
#fallism movement. The #fallism movement, more than being about unaffordable fees 
as previously mentioned, raised probing questions about the very nature of our South 
Africa’s “transforming” society; what it means to have a place in it and who gets to 
participate and be in/excluded from shaping what it is becoming. What would 
 
74  See Quinot G "Transformative legal education" 2012 (129) South African Law Journal 411; Moseneke D 
"Transformative constitutionalism: its implications for the law of contract" 2009 (20) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 411. 
75  Modiri J "Law's poverty" (2015) 18 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 224. 
76  Section 29 of the Constitution provides for a right to education.   
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transformative constitutionalists have us do? Should the fallists rather have mounted a 
court case in order to bring the issues they raised within the reach of the courts?  
Should they have relied on constitutional rights, in which instance it would have to have 
been the constitutional right to education which, whilst guaranteeing basic education, 
makes further (university) education subject to progressive realisation much like other 
socio-economic rights?77 
In concluding this section, it is worth reiterating the rub of my argument, namely, 
that transformative constitutionalism betrays its own claims and stated ambitions in 
that by overly privileging the adjudicative role of courts as the idealised site of 
contesting, determining and enforcing the meaning of the Constitution, it arrogates to 
the courts the power and right to ultimately control the ebb and flow of constitutional 
politics. For instance, even where consideration is given to what a transformative role 
for other branches and State institutions might be under what Liebenberg terms a 
“reconceptualised separation of powers”78, that role seems to centre around that of the 
courts and their powers to determine final constitutional meaning, and by necessary 
implication the visioning of what is possible and desirable (influenced, no doubt, by a 
small but influential group of constitutional law litigators, public interest law groups, 
and behind them legal academics).  
Considerations of constitutional supremacy and counter-majoritarianism 
notwithstanding, little attention seems to be paid to justifying why the privileging of 
courts and adjudication is either necessary or desirable, particularly considering the 
costs of litigation in South Africa.79  In sum, crucially, this court-centric bias has the 
natural result of tending to diminish, if not sometimes negating the critical roles of 
democratic politics; the other branches; constitutional institutions; civil society; and not 
least the populace; in the framing and development of the constitutional project.   
More profoundly in a society where to engage in sophisticated constitutional 
litigation depends not only on wealth, but also significantly on social and cultural 
capital, this bias towards adjudication poses difficult questions about how those within 
the discourse of transformative constitutionalism conceive of constitutional politics; 
where and how those politics “legitimately” play themselves out beyond the courts; and 
no less significantly, who is deemed to be a worthy political subject or agent in as far as 
contesting and determining what a “transformed” South Africa should look like or 
aspire to be. It is worth recalling that, as Terreblanche so correctly observed earlier, the 
“political transformation” ushered in by the Constitution has largely failed to disrupt the 
 
77  For a useful overview of the limits and possibilities of constitutionalised socio-economic rights in South 
Africa see the essays in Langford M, Cousins B, Dugard J, & Madlingozi T (eds.) Socio-economic rights in 
South Africa: symbols or substance? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2013).  
 
79  The matter of prohibitively high legal costs in South Africa is currently under investigation by the 
South African Law Reform Commission under Project 142, Issue Paper 36 “Investigation into legal 
costs” available at http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/ipapers/ip36-prj142-LegalFees.pdf (accessed 16 
April 2020). 
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racialised disparities of wealth, income, living conditions or life opportunities.  
Therefore, I argue here that it has been necessary to interrogate the value or the cost of 
an overly juridicised conception of constitutionalism particularly in the light of South 
Africa’s ever looming structural questions around prevailing redistributive injustice and 
continuing patterns of producing social, political, economic, cultural and epistemic 
inclusion/exclusion or insider/outsider status, only now on ostensibly non-racial lines.  
6. CONCLUSION  
As I draw to a close I turn to Tshepo Madlingozi in order to invoke his timely and 
searing critique of what he provocatively dubs “neo-apartheid constitutionalism” and its 
assimilationist instincts towards recognition, incorporation and distribution. In 
proffering this term, Madlingozi characterises post-1994 South Africa as a “society” that 
has achieved a “transformation” from the colonial to the neo-colonial in formal 
constitutional statist terms, but where that transformation has delivered a shift in State 
form rather than a material or substantive one as far as the lived experiences of the 
black majority, who remain structurally excluded, is concerned.  In advancing the 
reasons for the need to adopt this term, Madlingozi calls our attention to 
“the fact that post-1994 constitutional re-arrangements are transforming 
society in ways that do not instantiate a fundamental rupture with the 
inherited, sedimented and bifurcated social configuration … that in this time 
of neo-apartheid the contemporary discourse of social justice, which is 
transformative constitutionalism’s master frame for social emancipation, is 
actually complicit in the continuation of this anti-black bifurcated societal 
structure”80. 
Without elaborating on Madlingozi’s well-constructed and richly substantiated 
argument, I wish to highlight two important points with which I strongly concur.  First, 
that there is no denying South Africa has since 1994 experienced a transformation. 
Secondly, rather than erupt South Africa’s racist capitalist socio-economic foundations, 
transformative constitutionalism, as a “master frame”, has presided over and enabled 
the continuation of largely undisturbed white hegemony along multiple axes. In short, 
Madlingozi, I suggest, implicitly recognises that it is difficult to imagine post-apartheid 
South Africa outside of a narrative of transformation. However, beyond that, when 
examined closely relative to the lived reality of the black majority, one cannot but both 
recognise and question the work performed by transformative constitutionalism in the 
perpetuation of social injustice despite claims to the contrary. 
The aim of this article has been to advance a critique of South Africa’s embrace of a 
grammar of transformation after the official demise of colonial-apartheid, in particular 
how the resultant narrative has been deployed in a totalising fashion as it is held out as 
being definitive of the processes, measures and goals of change under the 1996 
Constitution. In performing this critique, I have argued that transformation’s ability to 
find wide and enduring resonance has had much to do with its emergence as a 
 
80  Madlingozi (2017) at 125. 
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transitional site of compromise that permitted erstwhile political and ideological 
adversaries to navigate a complex social and political transition where there were no 
clear winners or losers. A quarter of a century after the moment of transition, I have 
asked in this article why South Africa continues to be invested in this grammar and 
addressed myself to the implications of this. In essence, I have argued that whilst the 
imperative of constitutional transformation may have formed around a common 
commitment to constitutional rights and values, its lived manifestation in what has 
emerged as the hegemonic discourse of transformative constitutionalism with its bias 
for adjudication driven social change has negated any pretensions it may have projected 
as being an emancipatory discourse directed at disrupting the multiple legacies of 
colonial-apartheid.  
In summary, I have argued that as far as the narrative of transformation has been 
embraced and held out as encapsulating post-apartheid South Africa’s constitutive 
vision, then its culmination in the court-centric discourse of transformative 
constitutionalism has failed to offer any enduring concrete structural, material or 
epistemic interventions that gesture towards the disruption of the largely undisturbed 
patterns of white or Eurocentric economic, social, cultural and epistemic domination. 
Finally, it is worthy of note to observe that transformative constitutionalism’s discursive 
hegemony has largely come into place in parallel with a growing disillusionment and 
heightened calling into question of the compromises that underwrote the Constitution.  
The discourse’s conspicuous absence from contemporary debates regarding the 
growing political, social, and economic unrest that gestures towards the unravelling of 
these compromises, such as #feesmustfall, surely demands answers of the proponents 
of transformative constitutionalism as to how it continues to justify itself beyond its 
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